[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.“Our people religiously feel with moral convictions that racial integration that would lead to intermarriage is against the will of their creator,” Garner said.Kennedy was caught by surprise; rather than push back, he dodged, saying, “I think the question of intermarriage is really a question removed from what we are concerned with.That is a matter for the individuals involved.” Still, the meeting was a success, if only because Kennedy used the occasion to announce the creation of a religious advisory committee, under the leadership of J.Irwin Miller, the Indiana industrialist and National Council of Churches chairman.4Meanwhile, halfway between the White House and Capitol Hill, the Justice Department drafting team was continuing to rework the bill.Though its core parts were in place, two more titles were added after Kennedy’s June 11 speech.The first was an idea that had been floating around Congress since the late 1950s: a federal civil rights mediation service, which would parachute into nascent trouble spots before they got out of hand.The addition was partly political.It was thought that Southern Democrats would support a plank that put voluntary, nonbinding mediation between Jim Crow businesses and the hard force of federal law.5The other plank was equally political but aimed at the other end of the spectrum.For years now, Representative Adam Clayton Powell Jr.of Harlem, a fiery and controversial black politician, had appended “Powell amendments”—requirements that whatever the program was, it could not be implemented in a discriminatory manner—to various pieces of domestic legislation, in essence turning otherwise innocuous bills into civil rights proposals, which Southern Democrats would then turn on.The amendments made for good protest theater, but the consequence was a lot of very angry, otherwise pro-civil-rights legislators, who saw their bills sandbagged—and there was little they could say in response, lest they be tarred as anti-civil-rights.Several of them came to Robert Kennedy and Norbert Schlei demanding that they add a universal Powell amendment to the bill, applying a nondiscrimination requirement to all federal programs, so that Powell would finally shut up.6At first Kennedy, afraid of overloading the bill, was resistant, even when Representative James O’Hara of Missouri, a liberal ally, passed him a bill that he had already drafted to create just such a requirement.But on the weekend before the bill was introduced, Kennedy called O’Hara at home and asked him to draft a Powell plank to add to the bill.O’Hara called his secretary and had her meet him at his office, where he dictated a new version and had it in the attorney general’s hands by 1:00 p.m.This new plank, which came to be known as Title VI, gave the president the power to cut off funds to a state or local program that used them in a discriminatory manner.7There was also an extensive discussion over whether to add something about jobs—an FEPC, or else a training and public works title.But the sense inside the drafting room was that such a title would be a step too far for a bill that was already an enormous gamble.If the Republicans were wary of a bill banning discrimination in public accommodations—a law that was limited to the South, where the Democrats held sway—how would they feel about a bill that reached into the offices of their corporate allies and told them how to run their hiring practices? And yet fair employment had been a central demand of the civil rights movement for decades; it was impossible not to do something.“We were all conscious of the fact that some kind of provisions with respect to fair employment were terribly important and also in the almost, I think actually unanimous opinion of everyone who was involved in this, impossible to enact,” recalled Nicholas Katzenbach.And so, at the last minute, another compromise was reached: Kennedy would explicitly endorse FEPC legislation that was about to be taken up by the House Education and Labor Committee and sponsored by James Roosevelt, a liberal California representative (and son of Franklin Roosevelt).The drafters hoped such a gesture would pacify civil rights groups, though as Katzenbach admitted, “it was window dressing.”8There was a more contentious debate over whether to include a program of vocational training and, even, public jobs for millions of unemployed African Americans.Blacks had been by and large excluded from the public works programs of the New Deal, and many veteran New Deal liberals—Lyndon Johnson, for one—saw both a chance to right that wrong and an opportunity to take otherwise idle workers off the street.One such advocate was G.Mennen Williams, a former Michigan governor who was now the assistant secretary of state for African affairs (an heir to the Mennen personal care products fortune, Williams was known to friends and reporters as Soapy).In a memo to Sorensen on June 15, Williams predicted a wave of violence that summer without the “immediate institution of public works and, if necessary, work relief measures, to help absorb the unemployed and school leavers.”9Williams’s memo keyed into a complex discussion that had been going on for months within the administration.Kennedy was not a New Deal liberal; he preferred expansionary tax and trade policies over blunter, more direct tools such as public works as the best way to boost long-term employment.Privately, though, Kennedy recognized that efforts to boost economic growth would not do much to help the most marginalized workers, at least in the next few years.In September 1961 he had won passage of the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act, which included money to develop training programs for at-risk youth.And he already had Walter Heller, the head of his Council of Economic Advisers, working on plans for a major antipoverty bill, which he hoped to introduce in early 1964.10As Heller’s research was demonstrating—and as several high-profile books at the time, such as Michael Harrington’s The Other America, were documenting—the poverty and jobs problem was much too large to address in an already enormous civil rights bill.Still, as late as June 18, the day before the president was to submit his bill, O’Brien and Sorensen wrote a memo to Kennedy urging him, during a final review of the bill with congressional leaders, to discuss the possibility of Senators Mansfield and Dirksen cosponsoring a jobs program to be considered parallel to the civil rights bill.News of such conversations leaked to the press, who reported that Kennedy was planning a “?‘huge’ job training and vocational education to his civil rights legislative request”—according to Senator Hubert Humphrey, with a price tag of up to $1 billion.11Even as the drafting process advanced, the Department of Justice team was plotting its strategy for getting the bill through Congress [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]